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Abstract
The leaderboard in machine learning competitions is a tool to show the performance of various
participants and to compare them. However, the leaderboard quickly becomes no longer accu-
rate, due to hack or overfitting. This article gives two pieces of advice to prevent easy hack or
overfitting. By following these advice, we reach the conclusion that something like the Ladder
leaderboard introduced in [1] is inevitable. With this understanding, we naturally simplify Ladder
by eliminating its redundant computation and explain how to choose the parameter and interpret
it. We also prove that the sample complexity is cubic to the desired precision of the leaderboard.
1 Introduction
Machine learning competitions have been a popular platform for young students to practice their
knowledge, for scientists to apply their expertise, and for industries to solve their data mining problems.
For instance, the Internet streaming media company Netflix held the Netflix Prize competition in
2006, to find a better program to predict user preferences. Kaggle, an online platform, hosts regularly
competitions since 2010.
These competitions are usually prediction problems. The participant is given the independent variable
X, and then he is required to predict the dependent variable Y . Usually, the host divides his data into
three data sets: training, validation and test. The training dataset is fully available: every participant
(having a competition account) can download it and observe its Y as well as its X. This allows them
to build their models. The validation data set is partially available to participants: they can only
observe its X. This dataset is used to construct the so-called leaderboard. The participants submit
their prediction of Y to the host, and the host calculates their scores and ranks, and show them on the
leaderboard, so that every participant could know his chance to win the competition. The test dataset
is private. They are only used once at the final day to determine who is the final winner. Usually, the
winner gets a reward.
The reason that the final result is determined by the reserved test set instead of the validation set is
because the validation set could be hacked. Since the participant could submit his prediction over and
over during the life of the competition, he has much chance to improve his model’s performance on
the validation set, either by overfitting or hacking. In consequence, by the final day, the score he gets
on the validation set may have been much higher than his model deserves. This is why it is frequently
observed that the final winner of the competition is not the “winner” on the leaderboard.
Although the leaderboard has no effect on the decision of the final winner, it could be quite annoying
if it cannot truly reflect the performance of each participant. Firstly, such a leaderboard allures
inexperienced participants to overfit the validation set. Secondly, it encourages certain participants to
hack the validation set in order to get a fake temporary honor or to disturb the order of the competition.
Thirdly, it is not a good experience to see one’s non-overfitting model rank below someone hacking the
validation set. It could be said that during the whole life of the competition, the participants compete
around the leaderboard.
In view of this, some researchers tried to build an accurate leaderboard by preserving the accuracy of
the estimator of the loss function. This could be hard since the participant can modify their model
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adaptively according to the feedback they get from the leaderboard. [2, 3] suggest that maintain-
ing accurate estimates on a sequence of many adaptively chosen classifiers may be computationally
intractable. In light of this, [1] proposes the Ladder mechanism to restrain the feedback that the
participant could get from the leaderboard. The idea is that the participant gets a score if and only
if this score is higher than the best among the past by some margin. By restraining the feedback, the
participants have less information to adapt their models, and thus less chance to hack the leaderboard
by overfitting the validation set.
However, [1] fails to point out whether this kind of mechanism is necessary: does there exist any other
mechanism that achieves the same or better effect? If we have to use Ladder, what is its strength and
shortcoming? How well can we hack the leaderboard? Is is true that the first leader is better than the
second? If so, then by how much? There are two parameters in Ladder: margin η and precision η;
what is their relationship? Does the heuristic way to choose η provided in the paper have any theoretic
guarantee? If the participant holds many accounts, is Ladder still effective?
In our paper, we answer these questions. A better understanding of the leaderboard will be achieved
during the reading of this article. First, we show that traditional leaderboard is easy to hack. In
consequence, something like Ladder mechanism is necessary. Then, we perform another hack to show
that a leaderboard cannot be arbitrarily accurate (Section 2). Afterwards, we recognize the essence
inside the Ladder mechanism and thus simplify it (Section 3). Finally, we generalize the Theorem 3.1
in [1] to take into consideration of the fact that each participant may be allowed to possess multiple
accounts. And we slightly improve the upper bound as well (by eliminating the dependence on n in
the logarithmic factor). Our result shows that, while using Ladder mechanism, the leaderboard needs
O˜(M−3) samples to control the error within , where M is the number of accounts.1 This result
suggests that Ladder is relatively robust to number of submissions, but may still be vulnerable to
number of accounts (Section 4). In this article, we study the binary classification competition, but our
result can be straightforwardly generalized to other kinds of competitions.
The highlight of this article is that we are not advertising any “magic” algorithm; we are just pursuing
a better understanding of the leaderboard. We depart from some basic property (robust against hacks
and overfittings) that a leaderboard should satisfy in order to protect its accuracy and fairness. We
reach the conclusion that something like Ladder is inevitable. This understanding further allows us
to eliminate the redundant computation in the origin Ladder, and to only retain its essence. We also
give an upper bound. But we do not stop there. We interpret this upper bound and use it as a tool
to understand the advantages as well as limitation of Ladder when used in practice.
2 Leaderboard failure
In this sections, we show some examples where the leaderboard is hackable if it releases certain infor-
mation. With these examples, we know at least what to avoid when building a leaderboard.
2.1 Full-information leaderboard is hackable
In this subsection, we show that if a leaderboard shows the score of each submission, this leaderboard
is easy to hack.
Supposing that the validation set contains n different data points S = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xn, yn)},
where yi ∈ {0, 1} for each i. The participant is expected to build a function f = f(x), so that
f(x) is a good estimator of y. Let the score be the accuracy of this estimator, which is defined as
score(f) = 1n
∑n
i=1 1{yi=f(xi)} on the validation set. Every time the participant submits his yˆi = f(xi)
to the host, the host shows the score of f to the participant via the leaderboard. We show that this
kind of leaderboard is easy to hack.
1O˜() stands for omitting the logarithm term.
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Figure 1: Attack on various leaderboard (sample size: 1000). Blue: boosting attack on traditional
leaderboard. Green: boosting attack on Ladder. Red: brute-force enumeration attack on parameter-
free Ladder. Blue curve can also be seen as if a hacker uses boosting with 1000 accounts to hack
Ladder leaderboard.
To hack this leaderboard, we perform a boosting attack.2 The idea is that if we have many independent
submissions, whose accuracy are only a little higher than 0.5, then we can combine them via majority
vote policy to construct a submission whose accuracy is much higher than 0.5.
In detail, we randomly pick a vector u ∈ {0, 1}n. If its accuracy is higher than 0.5, then we keep v = u,
and otherwise v = 1n − u. Having got m such vectors v1, v2, . . . , vm, we construct the submission
yˆm = (yˆm1 , yˆ
m
2 , . . . , yˆ
m
n )
T , where yˆmi equals to 1, if
1
m
∑m
j=1 v
j
i > 0.5, and equals to 0 otherwise.
Figure 1 shows the result of this attack on a leaderboard of 1000 samples. We see that within 103
submissions, the hacker’s score climbs from 0.5 to 0.8 on the leaderboard. Therefore, in order to
protect the leaderboard from the boosting attack, we cannot release information each time there is
a submission. In consequence, we adopt the idea that the leaderboard gives the participant feedback
only when his score is higher than the highest in the past.
2.2 High-precision leaderboard is hackable
Normally, a leaderboard shows two things – score and rank. In this subsection, we show that if a
leaderboard precisely reflects the ranks, then this leaderboard is easy to hack.
For this, we consider a minimal leaderboard, which shows nothing other than the ranks. In other
words, the participants are not able to observe the scores. Furthermore, inheriting the argument from
the previous subsection, the leaderboard uses the highest score that a participant has ever achieved to
compute the rank. In other words, a participant knows nothing even if he beats his old scores unless
his new score is higher enough to beat another participant, whose rank was higher than his.
This leaderboard displays really little information. However, even with so little information displayed,
it is still hackable. For this, we perform a brute-force enumeration attack. Precisely, the hacker signs
up two accounts A and B. At first, he uses A to submit a random guess u1, and he gets a rank a1 for
A. Then, he flips one component in this submission (say, u11 from 0 to 1, or from 1 to 0), and uses B
to submit it as u2. He will get a rank b1 for B, which is different than a1. Let us assume that b1 is
higher than a1(otherwise, we just switch the name of account A and B). Then, he flips an unchanged
2Actually this is not really a boosting technique, but we use the same terminology as in [1] here.
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component (say u22) and switches to A to submit it as u3. The score u3 yields is either higher or lower
than u2. If it is lower than u2 (must be equal to u1 in this case), then he sees no change on A’s rank.
In this case, he repeats this step by flipping another component (say u23) until it is higher than u2 or
all components have been flipped once. If it is higher than u2, since the leaderboard precisely reflects
the rank, it must move A’s rank from a1to a2, which is higher than b1. Once again, the hacker switches
to the account B and repeats the process . . . He gets a1 ≺ b1 ≺ a2 ≺ b2 ≺ a3 ≺ · · ·. Since the score
is bounded by 1, and each score increment is constant, the hacker finally gets the score 1, which also
means getting all answers right and ranking the highest on the leaderboard.
With this simple attack, we show that as long as the leaderboard precisely reflects the rank, a hacker
equipped with two accounts can achieve arbitrarily high score. Therefore, a leaderboard should never
reveal precise ranks. In other words, there are cases where two participants with different scores (this
difference will not be observable) see them ranked together on the leaderboard.
3 Simplified Ladder leaderboard
In the previous section, we learned that a leaderboard should avoid some pitfalls. In this section, we
show that the Ladder leaderboard [1] successfully avoids them. We first introduce Ladder and simplify
it, and then demonstrate its robustness against boosting and enumeration attacks. Throughout this
paper, we use the following notation.
Notation. [x]η denotes the number x rounded to the nearest integer multiple of η; bxcη to the nearest
not higher than x; dxeη to the nearest not lower than x. η is a number in (0, 1], and is usually among
the values 0.1, 0.01, etc.. When η is missing, it is consider to be 1 in convention. log x denotes the
binary logarithm.
The idea of Ladder is simple. The leaderboard only shows the best score that a participant has
ever achieved, and updates it only when a record-breaking score is higher than it by some margin η
(Algorithm 1). Notice that there is a parameter η in this algorithm. To overcome this inconvenience,
[1] also suggests a parameter-free Ladder leaderboard. However, this parameter-free version is hackable
(Figure 1). The method is to make a first submission containing half 1 and half 0. Then switch the
place of a 1 and a 0 in each submission.
In this paper, we give a simplified Ladder version (Algorithm 2) as well as a way to choose the optimal
value of η. Comparing these two algorithms, the only tiny difference is the condition in Step 3 – we
drop the margin η. This raises naturally the question whether this modification breaks the algorithm?
No. In fact, the margin η is already captured in the assignment Rt ← [ht]η by he precision η. Since
Rt−1 is always an integer multiple of η, Rt can be greater than Rt−1 if and only if ht is higher than
Rt−1 by a margin of η2 . The simplification does not stop here. Indeed, Step 3 can be rephrased
as Rt = max
(
Rt−1, [ht]η
)
. So the idea of the simplified Ladder leaderboard is just to authentically
display the best score achieved by each participant so far, but with a certain level of precision η.
Algorithm 1 Original Ladder [1]
Assign initial score R0 ← −∞.
for round t = 1, 2, . . . do
1. Receive submission ut
2. ht ←score of ut
3. If ht > Rt−1 + η then Rt ← [ht]η else Rt ← Rt−1
4. Show Rt on the leaderboard
end for
Note: [x]η denotes the number x rounded to the nearest integer multiple of η.
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Algorithm 2 Simplified Ladder
Assign initial score R0 ← −∞.
for round t = 1, 2, . . . do
1. Receive submission ut
2. ht ←score of ut
3. If ht > Rt−1 then Rt ← [ht]η else Rt ← Rt−1
4. Show Rt on the leaderboard
end for
Note: [x]η denotes the number x rounded to the nearest integer multiple of η.
This understanding is very helpful. On the one hand, it simplifies the implementation of the Ladder
leaderboard. The practitioners have less chance to make an error (e.g., by accidentally dropping the
precision η or configure a smaller one). On the other hand, it greatly simplifies the analysis. η here is
no longer an algorithmic parameter. It is instead the precision which the leaderboard offers.
After the presentation of Ladder algorithm, now let us try to answer this question: does Ladder avoid
the pitfalls mentioned above? Yes. On the one hand, it only reveals the highest score so far. On
the other hand, it does not give arbitrarily precise information – a participant yielding 0.644 is not
distinguishable from another participant yielding 0.636 when η = 0.01.
But there still remain questions that whether Ladder is hackable. Is it robust against all attacks
besides the above mentioned ones? The answer is yes, provided that the attacker does not possess
many accounts. And the robustness is proportional to the cubic root of the size of the validation set.
If we want the precision η to be 0.1, we should have 103 samples; if η = 0.01, we will need 106 samples.
This will be proved in the next section.
Here again our understanding of Ladder contributes. If η is too large, which means that the precision
is low, the participants will not be distinguishable – they are clustered on the leaderboard. Such a
leaderboard is not informative. If η is too small, which means the precision is too high and the leader-
board reveals too much information, there will not be enough samples to maintain the authenticity of
the leaderboard – the leaderboard is easy to hack or overfit. Such a leaderboard is false. This trade-off
is the central topic of the next section.
In the rest of this section, we present some results about some attacks on Ladder. Figure 1 shows that
Ladder is robust against the boosting attack. Figure 2 shows some brute-force enumeration attacks
on Ladder. In these examples, to defend against the attacks, Ladder uses less samples than necessary,
for the brute-force is not very efficient, since it does not make use of all information available on the
leaderboard.
Figure 2: Attack on Ladder. Each trajectory is correspondent to an attack. Left: n=1000, η=0.01.
Right: n=20000, η=0.001.
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4 Sample complexity
In this section, we present the sample complexity of the Ladder leaderboard. We show that η is not
only the display precision of the leaderboard, but also the optimal value of η is the lowest leaderboard
error possible. This optimal value is η∗ = O˜
(
3
√
M
n
)
, where M is the number of accounts and n is the
number of samples in the validation set.
Suppose that our data (X,Y ) lie in some space Ω×{0, 1}. They follow a distribution D on this space.
Validation set S = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)} are samples drawn i.i.d. from this distribution. A classifier
of this problem is represented by the function f : Ω→ {0, 1}. The accuracy of this classifier is defined
as
RD(f) := Pr(f(X) = Y ).
Its accuracy on the validation set is defined as
RS(f) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
I(f(xi) = yi),
where I(·) is the indicator function.
RS(f) can be seen as an estimator of RD(f), whose error could be measured by the quantity |RS(f)−
RD(f)|. Normally, this error should be small [4, 5, 6, 7]. However, due to the overfitting or hack by
repeated and adaptive submissions, this error could grow larger and larger. As this error grows, the
leaderboard is no longer a qualified index of the performance of participants. The scores it displays
no longer reflect the true accuracy of the models, and the ranks it shows do not truly imply that one
participant’s model is better than another’s. This is why the traditional leaderboard fails.
Since RS(f) is no longer a good estimator of RD(f), one may ask whether there exist other estimators.
[2, 3] show that no computationally efficient estimator can achieve error o(1) on more than n2+o(1)
adaptively chosen functions in a traditional leaderboard. Therefore, [1] as well as this article tries
another approach: the Ladder leaderboard.
In Ladder, the leaderboard only displays the best ever score that an account has achieved Rt :=
max1≤i≤tRS(fi), where fi is the function which characterizes the i-th submission associated with a
given account. Thus, at the moment t, the error of the score displayed on the leaderboard could be
measured by the quantity |Rt−max1≤i≤tRD(fi)|. Across the time, the leaderboard error of R1, . . . , Rk
of a single account is measured with
lberr(R1, . . . , Rk) := max
1≤t≤k
∣∣∣∣Rt − max1≤i≤tRD(fi)
∣∣∣∣ .
A small leaderboard error means that the score displayed on the leaderboard is close to the best score
the account in question gets on the underlying true distribution.
[1] gives an upper bound to the leaderboard error. However, it does not take into consideration the
fact that a participant may possess multiple accounts, in which case their reasoning breaks. In this
paper, we take that into consideration and our upper bound is slightly tighter than theirs (logarithmic
factor) when degenerated to one-person-one-account case.
If a participant has multiple accounts, he can then switch among different accounts to submit successive
submissions. His submission thus does not depend only on the history of the current account, but also
on the histories of other accounts. Denote
Ft =
{
fmi : 1 ≤ i ≤ km, 1 ≤ m ≤M,
M∑
m=1
km = t
}
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as the submission history right after the moment t, where fmi signifies using account m to submit
account m’s i-th submission, and km is the subtotal submissions associated with account m. Denote
Rt =
{
Rmi : 1 ≤ i ≤ km, 1 ≤ m ≤M,
M∑
m=1
km = t
}
as the feedback (score) history associated with Ft.
Theorem. Given a competition with a validation set of n samples, where the Ladder leaderboard
employs a display precision of η , and each participant can possess at most M accounts. For any
set of k (adaptively chosen) classifiers Fk submitted by a participant, his scores Rk displayed on the
leaderboard satisfy
Pr
{
max
1≤t≤km,1≤m≤M
∣∣∣∣Rmt − max1≤i≤tRD(fmi )
∣∣∣∣ > η} ≤ exp(−η2n2 +
(
M
η
+ 1
)
log 2k + 1
)
. (1)
In particular, for some η = O
(
3
√
M log k
n
)
, Ladder achieves with high probability: for any m =
1, . . . ,M ,
lberr(Rm1 , . . . , R
m
km) ≤ O
(
3
√
M log k
n
)
.
Here, we successfully thrust the number of submissions k into the logarithmic factor. Thus, the
leaderboard error is no longer sensitive to the number of submissions. A participant can submit as
many times as he wishes (if he is able of course). However, we notice that the number of accounts
M is still outside of the logarithmic factor, which means that the leaderboard error grows quickly
when M grows. Although it is only an upper bound, which is less persuasive than a lower bound,
we can provide a counter example to illustrate the effect of multi-account. Consider the extreme case
where the participant submits each submission with a brand new account every time (i.e., M = k),
the leaderboard error grows quickly with the submissions. Indeed, Ladder shows no difference from
the traditional leaderboard in this case.
The theorem’s aim is to prove a small leaderboard error. But why does it matter? What is the
relation to the robustness of a leaderboard? The consequence of a small leaderboard error means that
a participant’s score sticks to his score on the ground truth. It is not likely that he could climb up on
the leaderboard either by overfitting or by hack. If he marks a leap on the leaderboard, chances are
that he really improved his prediction model.
Therefore, the theorem can be interpreted as: when the display precision of ladder is set to the optimal
value η∗ = O
(
3
√
M log k
n
)
, a participant who gets a score s (an integer multiple of η∗) has large chance
that his true score on the ground truth is within [s− η∗, s+ η∗]. If two participants A and B get
the score sA and sB respectively, where sA − sB > 2η∗, chances are that A really outperforms B.
Particularly, a hacker has little chance to get a score higher than 12 + η
∗, since he learns nothing and
his true score should be the same as the random guess.
Naturally, we would like η∗ small. This depends on n. We see that to achieve a small η∗ = , we will
need O
(
M log k
3
)
samples.
5 Proof of Theorem
From the state-of-art literature [4, 5, 6, 7], we already have
Pr
{
max
1≤t≤k
|RS(ht)−RD(ht)| > ε
}
≤ 2k exp(−2ε2n), (2)
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for a series of functions h1, . . . , hk which are independent of the validation set S. This inequality is
quite close to our destination. However, because of the sequential and adaptive nature of our problem,
ht+1 is a function of RS(h1), . . . , RS(ht), which means that it is not independent of S. Thus, we
cannot apply the above inequality directly. The technique employed in this proof is to eliminate the
dependence by enumerating all possible realizations.
Proof. Suppose that the participant has an algorithm A to decide the next function which characterizes
the next submission, and which account to submit with, in using the past history: ht+1 = A(Rt), where
ht+1 will become one member of the fmi in Ft+1. A can be either deterministic or random provided
that it does not depend on S.
ht+1 is dependent on S, however,
g := A
{
rmi : 1 ≤ i ≤ km, 1 ≤ m ≤M,
M∑
m=1
km = t
}
is not, where rmi is one realization of Rmi . In consequence, we can apply (2) to g. The remaining issue
is to count how many different g’s we could have within k submissions.
To this end, we use a compression algorithm to encode every possible g. First of all, to specify at which
submission this g is submitted, we need dlog ke bits. Then, each g can have history coming from M
different accounts. For each single account, we calculate the bits needed. Since the history within an
account is a monotone increasing series, which should be multiples of 1/η and be in interval [0, 1], it
can only take value in d1/ηe numbers and jump at most b1/ηc steps. Now we calculate the number of
bits required to encode each jump. Here, we use a trick, which allows us to get rid of the n inside the
logarithm in [1] – we only code the place where there is a jump regardless of jumping height. If the
jump height is 1/η, then we code this place once. If the jump height is s/η, then we code it s times.
To code this place once, we need at most dlog ke bits. Thus, the total bits demanded is
dlog ke+M ×
⌊
1
η
⌋
× dlog ke ≤ (M
η
+ 1) log 2k.
Then, we can apply (2) to the g’s in setting  = η/2:
Pr
{
max
g
|RS(g)−RD(g)| > η
2
}
≤ 2× 2(Mη +1) log 2k exp
(
−η
2n
2
)
.
The left side equals exactly
Pr
{
max
h∈Fk
|RS(h)−RD(h)| > η
2
}
,
while the right side is bounded by
exp
(
−η
2n
2
+
(
M
η
+ 1
)
log 2k + 1
)
,
which is exactly the right side of (1).
Conditioned on the event
{
maxh∈Fk |RS(h)−RD(h)| ≤ η2
}
, we have
max
1≤t≤km,1≤m≤M
∣∣∣∣max1≤i≤tRS(fmi )− max1≤i≤tRD(fmi )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ η2 .
And since we have ∣∣∣∣Rmt − max1≤i≤tRS(fmi )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ η2
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because of the rounding error, by the triangular inequality, we get
max
1≤t≤km,1≤m≤M
∣∣∣∣Rmt − max1≤i≤tRD(fmi )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ η,
which is exactly what we want on the left side of (1).
6 Discussion
Ladder is vulnerable if the number of accounts each participant can hold is unlimited. It is possible
to launch a boosting attack on Ladder leaderboard by using a brand-new account for each submission
(Figure (1)). Given limited number of accounts (e.g. one account for each participant), Ladder is
robust against the number of submissions. However, compared with the quadratic sample complexity
of general statistical / machine learning tasks, the cubic sample complexity of the Ladder leaderboard
may still remain a bit too expensive. For a mere 0.01 leaderboard error, the validation set has to have
106 samples. This is not possible in most competitions. Even if it is, we may still have questions such
as why not put these samples into the training dataset so as to enable the participants to use more
complex models. This makes the loss of Ladder more than its gain. On the other hand, we do not
know whether this cubic root upper bound is tight. We have yet found an efficient attack algorithm
that could achieve this upper bound, nor have we discovered a tight lower bound. That is to say,
Ladder may actually work better than we expected here. In practice, the competition hosts employ
as well other measures, such as limiting the number of submissions per day, disqualifying participants
secretly signing up other accounts etc., to strengthen the accuracy of the leaderboard. These measures
could be combined with Ladder so as to provide a more accurate leaderboard than the traditional one.
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